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Uncertainty and the Great Slump†
By JASON LENNARD∗
This article investigates the impact of economic policy uncertainty on the British
interwar economy. The first type of evidence examined is qualitative. The historical
record shows that contemporaries regularly reported the incidence and consequences
of major uncertainty shocks. The second type of evidence analysed is quantitative.
Based on a new index of economic policy uncertainty constructed from newspapers
and vector autoregressions, the results suggest that uncertainty was an important
source of economic fluctuations in Britain between the wars.
T he interwar period holds a number of unwanted records in British economichistory. Unemployment in the 1930s was higher than at any point since reliable
records began in 1855.1 The volatility of output growth was greater than under
any macroeconomic regime of the past three centuries.2 No recession since the
beginning of the 1700s has been as deep as that of the early 1920s.3 What caused
this instability?
Textbook answers to this question identify four main factors. The first factor is
the reduction in hours worked after the First World War, which led to an increase
in the natural rate of unemployment.4 The second is the behaviour of the nominal
and real exchange rate, which had both short- and long-run effects.5 The third is
the decline of the old staple industries.6 Textiles, iron and steel, and shipbuilding
suffered from weak demand and oversupply.7 The final factor is the constraint on
stabilization policy.Monetary policy was curbed by the commitment to the interwar
gold standard, while fiscal policy was limited by the balanced budget orthodoxy of
the time.
Yet contemporaries were concerned with another issue. Economists,
industrialists, journalists, and politicians frequently held uncertainty over economic
policy accountable for the turbulence. In 1930, for example, the Labour
government faced a vote of no confidence on this issue.WinstonChurchill appealed
to the House of Commons: ‘the charge that we make against the Chancellor of the
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Exchequer is that, without due cause, he has created uncertainty which has been
harmful to trade and employment’.8 Ultimately, the noes had it by a majority of
73 and the government avoided defeat. The role of uncertainty has since been
relegated to a footnote in the economic history of interwar Britain.
Beyond the fog of 1930, there may have been other uncertain times, given the
volume of extraordinary events. Economically, there was the return to and break
from the gold standard, the fiscal aftermath of the First World War, and the slide
to protection. Politically, there were snap general elections in 1923 and 1931, hung
Parliaments following the elections of 1923 and 1929 and National Governments
during the 1930s.
A possible explanation for why the impact of uncertainty has not been
investigated further in this context is measurement. As a nebulous concept,
uncertainty is difficult to quantify. Alexopoulos and Cohen and Baker et al. address
this challenge by constructing indices based on the frequency of articles in a sample
of newspapers relating to economic policy uncertainty.9 As newspapers reflect the
public discourse, the intuition is that changes in coverage of this topic are an
informative indicator of variation in agents’ perceptions of uncertainty.10 Vector
autoregressions (VARs) show that these measures have been associated with lower
output and higher unemployment and volatility in the US.
This article revisits the old uncertainty hypothesis using a new index of economic
policy uncertainty constructed from the archives of the Daily Mail, the Guardian,
and The Times. The index confirms that the interwar period was indeed a time of
uncertainty. A VAR and narrative evidence suggest that this uncertainty negatively
affected the British economy.
The rest of this article is structured as follows. Section I reviews the relevant
theoretical and empirical literature. Section II deals with the measurement of
economic policy uncertainty. Section III discusses the sources of fluctuations in
uncertainty. Section IV presents narrative evidence documenting how uncertainty
affected the economy. Section V quantifies these effects. Section VI assesses the
sensitivity of the baseline results to a series of alternative specifications. Section VII
concludes.
I. Previous literature
There is a rich literature investigating the macroeconomic effects of uncertainty in
theory and in practice. The theoretical literature has emphasized that uncertainty
can both depress and stimulate the economy. On one hand, uncertainty increases
the option value of postponing decisions that are costly to reverse. As a result, firms
delay investment and households hold back on durable consumption, leading to
lower output and employment.11 Bernanke’s ‘bad news principle’ suggests that this
effect may not be linear, as what matters for irreversible investment is uncertainty
that changes the probability of bad, as opposed to good, outcomes.12 On the other
8 Hansard (Commons), 5th ser., CCXXXVI, 13 March 1930, cols. 1535–654.
9 Alexopoulos and Cohen, ‘Power of print’; Baker, Bloom, and Davis, ‘Measuring economic policy uncertainty’.
10 See Alexopoulos andCohen, ‘Power of print’, for amore detailed discussion of variousmeasures of uncertainty.
11 Bernanke, ‘Irreversibility’; Bertola, Guiso, and Pistaferri, ‘Uncertainty and consumer durables’; Mathy and
Ziebarth, ‘How much does political uncertainty matter?’.
12 Bernanke, ‘Irreversibility’.
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hand, uncertainty can generate growth. One channel is the ‘growth options’ effect.
As uncertainty increases the spread of possible outcomes, bigger prizes for winners
are potentially available, which can stimulate investment.13 Another channel is the
Oi–Hartman–Abel effect, which suggests that uncertainty can be desirable in the
absence of adjustment costs as firms are able to expand to exploit good outcomes
but contract to insure against bad outcomes.14
The empirical literature has addressed the major practical issue of measuring
uncertainty in a variety of ways. Among the ‘first generation’ of indicators are
the volatility of various asset prices, the dispersion of firm-level outcomes, and
the disagreement of forecasts.15 An important criticism of these measures is that
although they may be correlated with uncertainty, they may also be responsive
to other factors.16 Share price volatility, for example, can change as a result of
variation in leverage, risk aversion, or sentiment.17 In a historical context, a further
limitation is that collecting these data can be challenging.
A significant advance is the development of news-based indicators, which are
based on the frequency of key words related to uncertainty in newspapers. The
advantages of these indices over first generation measures are that, first, they are
more reliable; second, they allow for the measurement of not only macroeconomic
but also other types of uncertainty, such as economic policy uncertainty; and
third, they can be constructed historically as long as newspaper archives are
available.18
There are a number of key references in this literature. First, Alexopoulos and
Cohen construct macroeconomic and economic policy uncertainty indices for the
US between 1985 and 2007 based on the frequency of relevant articles in the New
York Times.19 Second, Baker et al. measure economic policy uncertainty in the US
between 1985 and 2014 using a sample of 10 newspapers.20 These articles show
that uncertainty causes significant drops in output and employment.
Uncertainty has also been studied in historical contexts. Using the variability
of stock markets and qualitative evidence, Romer argues that the hangover of
uncertainty from the Great Crash was a key factor in the propagation of the Great
Depression.21 Mathy constructs a measure of uncertainty based on articles in the
New York Times during the Great Depression, showing that uncertainty accounted
for a substantial share of the deep decline in industrial production.22 Mathy and
Ziebarth study political uncertainty in Louisiana during the 1920s and 1930s
using newspapers and stock return volatility, finding no impact of uncertainty on
employment.23 Lopez and Mitchener measure uncertainty based on the realized
volatility of exchange rates for 10 European economies in the aftermath of the
13 Bloom, ‘Fluctuations in uncertainty’.
14 Oi, ‘Desirability of price instability’; Hartman, ‘Effects of price and cost uncertainty’; Abel, ‘Optimal
investment’.
15 Bloom, ‘Fluctuations in uncertainty’.
16 Jurado, Ludvigson, and Ng, ‘Measuring uncertainty’.
17 Alexopoulos and Cohen, ‘Power of print’.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Baker et al., ‘Measuring economic policy uncertainty’.
21 Romer, ‘Great Crash’.
22 Mathy, ‘How much did uncertainty shocks matter?’.
23 Mathy and Ziebarth, ‘How much does political uncertainty matter?’.
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First World War.24 The results suggest that uncertainty pushed Austria, Germany,
Hungary, and Poland towards hyperinflation.
A related strand of research is on expectations. Whereas an expectation is a belief
about the future path of a variable, uncertainty is the doubt around that path. As
both are difficult to measure in historical contexts, similar approaches have been
used in the literature. For example, rising inflation expectations are an important
explanation for the American recovery from the Great Depression.25 In order to
measure expected inflation in a data-scarce context, researchers have turned to
newspapers to identify whether there were spikes in coverage of inflation relative
to deflation.26 This ‘quantitative news’ approach has also been used in the case of
the recovery from the German Great Depression.27
II. Measuring economic policy uncertainty
Measuring uncertainty over economic policy is challenging as it is not directly
observable. In order to overcome this challenge, an index is developed based on
the number of articles about economic policy uncertainty relative to all articles
in a sample of newspapers: the Daily Mail, the Guardian, and The Times. An
article is identified as relating to economic policy uncertainty if it contains
an economic, policy, and uncertainty related term. The economic terms are
‘business’, ‘commerce’, ‘commercial’, ‘economic’, ‘economy’, and ‘industry’. The
policy terms include ‘Bank of England’, ‘Bank Rate’, ‘budget’, ‘deficit’, ‘duty’,
‘policy’, ‘regulation’, ‘spending’, ‘tariff ’, ‘tax’, and ‘war’. The uncertainty terms
are ‘uncertain’ and ‘uncertainty’. Plurals of the key words are also included, such
as ‘uncertainties’.
The index is constructed as follows: first, by counting the number of articles
about economic policy uncertainty in newspaper i = 1, 2, 3 in month t, denoted
Xit ; second, by counting the total number of articles in newspaper i in month t,
Nit ; third, by calculating the ratio of articles about economic policy uncertainty
to total articles in newspaper i in month t: Yit = XitNit ; fourth, by normalizing the
newspaper-specific ratios: Zit = Yitσi , where σi is the sample standard deviation of




3 ; and sixth, by dividing the basic index, Zt , by its mean, Z¯, and
multiplying by 100 to construct the final index: EPUt = ZtZ¯ × 100.
An important decision was the selection of the search terms. The starting point
was to compile a set of candidate key words, consisting of standard terms in the
literature and others that may have been relevant in interwar Britain.28 Experiments
were carried out with different subsets of these words, reading all of the identified
articles in a sample of months with the objective of minimizing the sum of false
positives (identified articles that were not about economic policy uncertainty) and
false negatives (articles that were about economic policy uncertainty not identified
24 Lopez and Mitchener, ‘Uncertainty and hyperinflation’.
25 Temin and Wigmore, ‘End of one big deflation’; Eggertsson, ‘Great expectations’.
26 Binder, ‘Estimation’; Jalil and Rua, ‘Inflation expectations’.
27 Daniel and ter Steege, ‘Inflation expectations’.
28 Baker et al., ‘Measuring economic policy uncertainty’.
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Figure 1. New economic policy uncertainty index for the UK, 1920–38
Source: See section II.
as such). Some non-standard terms helped to lower the rate of false negatives, such
as ‘Bank Rate’, the main instrument of monetary policy, and ‘duty’, a common
word for tariff. However, others raised the number of false positives, such as various
synonyms for uncertainty (for instance, ‘doubt’).
Another important decision was the selection of newspapers. TheDailyMail, the
Guardian, and The Times are included, based on a number of factors. First, these
publications had significant readerships with average daily circulations in 1930 of
1,968,000, 47,000, and 187,000, respectively.29 Second, these publications are
broadly balanced in terms of political slant. Third, these publications have digital
archives that permit sufficiently detailed searches.30
III. Fluctuations in economic policy uncertainty
The new economic policy uncertainty (EPU) index is shown in figure 1.31 The
interpretation is that larger (smaller) values are associated with greater (lesser)
economic policy uncertainty. What caused these fluctuations in uncertainty? To
29 Butler and Freeman, British political facts, p. 284.
30 A number of other publications were considered, such as the Economist and Financial Times. At the time of
writing, however, the digital archives of these newspapers do not allow searches of the necessary complexity.
31 The data are available in online app. S1.
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answer this question, the Daily Mail, the Guardian, and The Times were consulted,
as well as a wider range of primary sources.
Following the end of the Great War, economic policy uncertainty was at fever
pitch. In June 1920, EPU increased by 37 per cent. According to the Economist,
the public did not know whether the war wealth levy had been abandoned or not:
At home uncertainty concerning the government’s action with regard to the war wealth
tax is still the chief preoccupation of the business world. It was definitely stated by a
Sunday paper last Sunday that the tax had been abandoned. This apparently was not
correct, although it seems to have been true that opinion in the Cabinet has been growing
against it with considerable force, and it seems likely that the statement of the Sunday
Express may turn out to be wrong only in being made a week or so too early.32
In addition, there were anxieties related to Irish independence, such as debates in
the House of Commons on 2, 14, and 28 June and riots in Londonderry on 19
June.33
The EPU index spiked again in November 1923. The Economist wrote that the
prime minister, Stanley Baldwin, U-turned on the Conservative party’s pledge
of the previous year of ‘no fundamental fiscal change’, which ‘appealed to an
electorate that was weary of legislation and experiment’, opting instead for ‘fiscal
revolution’.34 A snap general election was held on 6 December, resulting in a hung
Parliament.
On 28 April 1925 the UK returned to the gold standard at the prewar parity
of £3.85 per ounce. The return was not associated with an immediate change
in EPU, which is not surprising as the intention to do so had been announced
as early as November 1919.35 EPU was almost a third lower on average during
the gold standard, relative to the periods before and after. While the interwar gold
standard may have been flawed in retrospect, an advantage in real time was reduced
uncertainty.
The index climbed sharply in April 1926. One cause was the looming general
strike. Although the strike did not come into force until May, news of growing
tension was reported in April. The Times, for instance, wrote of ‘the uncertainty of
the coal trade trouble’ and of the ‘baffling uncertainties regarding the coal crisis’.36
Another cause was Winston Churchill’s second budget as chancellor. This was
expected to be less ‘spectacular’ than his first, but uncertainty remained over
whether taxes would be cut.37
The EPU index increased by 89 per cent in February 1930. As the budget loomed
on 14 April, there was significant uncertainty over whether the chancellor, Philip
Snowden, would alter theMcKennaDuties or the Safeguarding of Industries Act.38
The Financial Times commented several times on the ‘budget uncertainties’.39
32 Economist, 5 June 1920, pp. 1241–2.
33 Ibid., 5 June 1920, p. 1241; 19 June 1920, p. 1333; 26 June 1920, p. 1385; 3 July 1920, p. 2.
34 Ibid., 17 Nov. 1923, p. 863.
35 Solomou, Themes in macroeconomic history, p. 93.
36 The Times, 10 April 1926, p. 17; 30 April 1926, p. 25.
37 Economist, 1 May 1926, p. 867.
38 See de Bromhead, Fernihough, Lampe, and O’Rourke, ‘When Britain turned inward’, for a brief history of
interwar trade policy.
39 Financial Times, 4 Feb. 1930, p. 6; 7 Feb. 1930, p. 7.
© 2020 The Author. The Economic History Review published by John Wiley & Sons
Ltd on behalf of Economic History Society.
Economic History Review, 73, 3 (2020)
850 JASON LENNARD
Sir Walter Raine, president of the Association of British Chambers of Commerce,
went to HM Treasury to plead to the chancellor:
Can you see your way to make an immediate statement with regard to the McKenna
Duties and the Safeguarding Duties? . . . There is a precedent for what I am suggesting
on behalf of industry in the fact that one of your predecessors, Sir Austen Chamberlain,
made a declaration in advance of his Budget, in regard to excess profits duties. The
situation is much more serious than it was then, and if you can see your way to do
something now to cause this uncertainty to be dissipated, you will help trade: whereas if
we have to wait until April 14, I am afraid that the damage, so far as this year’s trade is
concerned, will be very serious.40
September 1931 was blighted by a series of major events. One was the second
budget of the year as well as the increasing likelihood of an early general election.
The Mail wrote that ‘there is, as is only natural, uncertainty pending to-morrow’s
Budget announcement . . . But if the folly of a general election next month is
persisted in, then we shall have a further period of paralysing uncertainty’.41 The
Economist noted that there was ‘growing talk of an early General Election in this
country’, while the Financial Times observed that there was ‘uncertainty regarding
the date of the General Election’.42 Another major event was Britain’s departure
from the gold standard. According to contemporaries, the uncertainty did not
stem from the period leading up to the break from gold but the period after. The
Times noted that ‘there remained, however, immense uncertainties arising out of
Britain’s action in suspending gold redemption’, while according to the Economist
‘the week’s events, in short, showed that professional and private investors were
uncertain of the extent of possible development under the new currency regime’.43
Policy inertia on multiple fronts came to a head in April 1932. The Economist
argued that the ‘world was in doubt as to our monetary policy’.44 Ahead of Neville
Chamberlain’s first budget, the Daily Mail reported that ‘the country is anxiously
waiting for a full declaration of future tariff policy . . . Industry cannot plan ahead
if it is left in ignorance and uncertainty’.45 The Financial Times again referred to
‘budget uncertainties’, while The Times observed that:
this uncertainty applies, it is true, more especially to the Revenue Estimates; for until
the outcome of the Lausanne meeting and of the Ottawa Conference is known it will
hardly be possible to do much more than guess the yield of many sources of income.
Meanwhile on the expenditure side too there must remain an element of uncertainty so
long as the world problem of government indebtedness remains unsolved.46
‘A period of uneasy suspense’ hung over December 1932 as a result of the war
debts due to the US.47 The British, French, and other European governments had
asked the US to reconsider the payments. According to the Economist, ‘uncertainty
40 The Times, 28 Feb. 1930, p. 16.
41 Daily Mail, 9 Sept. 1931, p. 2.
42 Economist, 19 Sept. 1931, p. 525; Financial Times, 21. Sept. 1931, p. 5.
43 The Times, 28 Sept. 1931, p. 20; Economist, 26 Sept. 31, p. 572.
44 Economist, 30 April 1932, p. 951.
45 Daily Mail, 18 April 1932, p. 10.
46 Financial Times, 20 April 1932, p. 1; The Times, 18 April 1932, p. 13.
47 Economist, 3 Dec. 1932, p. 1015.
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as to the debt outcome has acted as a drag on all markets, and has probably to
some extent injured trade in general’.48
Uncertainty jumped again in March 1933. One possible cause was Neville
Chamberlain’s budget, which was to be delivered in April. Another source of
uncertainty was the war debts, which were once again soon due. The Financial
Times summarized:
Conflicting stories are in circulation here regarding the war debt instalment due on
15th June and the future of the Liberty bonds. According to the cabled reports from
London and elsewhere, widely published here in the past few days, it is evident that
the foreign correspondents are as much in the dark as those here at home, and are
largely guessing at the position. They have based their stories on a few known facts,
plus a little ‘information’ gleaned in talks with officials at Washington—other than Mr.
Roosevelt—who are also merely guessing. It is no secret that preliminary talks have been
held between Government officials here and in London regarding war debts and the next
payment due in June.49
The EPU index increased by 77 per cent in April 1937. An important determinant
was ‘budget uncertainty’ once again.50 The Daily Mail observed that ‘news of the
additional defence contribution, which came as a surprise, caused uncertainty’,
while the Financial Times wrote that there was uncertainty ‘resulting from the
profits tax proposals’.51 The final major event came in September 1938, which
began with an emergency meeting of the cabinet, escalated into one of Europe’s
most ‘nerve-racking weeks’, and ended with the Munich Agreement.52
To summarize, uncertainty built around recurring events in the calendar such as
budget announcements and general elections. Uncertainty also spiked in response
to more specific factors such as the general strike, inter-allied debt, and the rising
probability of war.
An interesting question is how coverage differed between newspapers. The mean
number of articles reporting economic policy uncertainty was 8 in the Daily Mail,
31 in the Guardian, and 42 in The Times. Therefore, the Daily Mail was less
concerned with the specific issue of economic policy uncertainty, on average, than
the Guardian and The Times, which perhaps reflects theMail’s broader readership.
Another interesting question is how the coverage covaried across newspapers.
Each of the individual indices has a positive and statistically significant correlation
with each other. The correlation between the Daily Mail and the Guardian is 0.47
(p < 0.01), between the Daily Mail and The Times is 0.55 (p < 0.01), and between
the Guardian and The Times is 0.53 (p < 0.01). That The Times had the highest
average correlation with the other publications suggests that it was middling in
terms of political slant. The implication is that the other papers were slightly off-
centre, presumably with the Guardian to the left and the Mail to the right.
The new EPU index is not the first to cover the interwar period in Britain.
Baker et al. have produced an index that spans from 1900 until the present.53
48 Ibid., 17 Dec. 1932, p. 1136.
49 Financial Times, 23 March 1933, p. 7.
50 Ibid., 20 April 1937, p. 1.
51 Daily Mail, 21 April 1937, p. 2; Financial Times, 24 April 1937, p. 10.
52 Economist, 17 Sept. 1938, p. 529.
53 Baker et al., ‘Measuring economic policy uncertainty’.
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Figure 2. Comparing economic policy uncertainty indices for the UK, 1920–38
Sources: See section II and Baker et al., ‘Measuring economic policy uncertainty’.
The new index builds on the existing series in two important ways. First, the
search set is expanded to include period-appropriate terms to better capture
uncertainty over monetary and tariff policy. Second, the number of newspapers
is increased to include not only the Guardian and The Times but also the Daily
Mail. Expanding the coverage has several advantages. One is to reduce the amount
of variation stemming from idiosyncratic factors such as newspaper-specific bias,
optical character recognition error, and so on. That the individual indices are
far from perfectly correlated with each other suggests that there is non-trivial
independent variation. Another is to redress the political slant so that the right
(Daily Mail), left (Guardian), and centre (The Times) are represented.
As shown in figure 2, the two series are positively, although not perfectly,
correlated (r = 0.8, p < 0.01). There are deviations around some of the major
events identified in the chronology. For example, in June 1920, when there
was uncertainty regarding the war wealth levy, the new index increases to a
greater extent than the existing series. Equally, in February 1930, coinciding with
newspaper reports of budget uncertainties, the new series is more sensitive. Finally,
around September 1931, when a newmonetary regime was adopted, the new index
is higher.
This analysis suggests that the new index provides a bettermeasure of uncertainty
in this particular period. In any case, previous research has not investigated how
economic policy uncertainty affected the economy in interwar Britain. It is to this
question that we now turn.
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IV. The macroeconomic effects of economic policy uncertainty:
qualitative evidence
This section analyses qualitative evidence relating to the macroeconomic effects
of economic policy uncertainty in interwar Britain. The first type of evidence
considered is economic reports in contemporary newspapers.
On the Safeguarding Act, for example, the Guardian noted that ‘industry can
adapt itself to any stable and calculable condition, even the condition of a regular
tariff; the one condition fatal to enterprise and trade recovery is uncertainty. The
Government’s proposal is a proposal to introduce such uncertainty’.54 In relation to
the possibility of a general election, Churchill observed that ‘the uncertainty is bad
from every point of view. It hangs like a cloud over the trade of the country’.55
In a letter to the editor of The Times in the summer of 1932, signed by the
economics departments of the universities of Oxford (including James Meade)
and Cambridge (including John Maynard Keynes), the government was urged
to ‘explicitly declare its policy in advance. A definite pronouncement of this kind
should remove all fears of uncontrolled inflation—fears which arise primarily from a
sense of uncertainty’.56 The Economist summarized that ‘business this year has been
overshadowed by the economic and political uncertainty at home and abroad’.57
Uncertainty’s depressive effect on jobs was also widely recognized. In the winter
of 1920, the Daily Mail observed that ‘among the main causes of unemployment
at the present moment . . . is uncertainty in the business world’.58 In the same
newspaper a decade later, Sir William Morris, founder of Morris Motors Ltd,
attacked the incumbent government on the same issue:
No business could be run on the lines on which we try to run England. Whoever heard
in the board room of a successful commercial house the counterpart of such childish
bickerings and pettifogging personal pin-prickings as those to which we have been treated
of late in our supposedly austere and deep-thinking House of Parliament? . . . This is the
position we find ourselves in to-day, floundering in a sea of uncertainty . . . the result
being colossal unemployment.59
Meanwhile The Times noted:
There are manufacturers unable to do their usual amount of trade because of an
expectation, or a bare possibility, that Government policy may interfere with their
markets and affect the price of their products. Commercial uncertainty is contagious,
and uncertainty soon intensifies the depression of which the increase of unemployment
is a measure. Enterprise languishes in a period of political uncertainty.60
The narrative evidence also sheds light on some other economic outcomes of
uncertainty. The Mail observed that ‘surely the uncertainty as to taxation has had
much to do with the lessened popularity of industrial investments’, which is one of
54 Guardian, 20 Dec. 1924, p. 13.
55 The Times, 19 March 1930, p. 20.
56 Ibid., 5 July 1932, p. 10.
57 Economist, 30 Jan. 1932, p. 1.
58 Daily Mail, 30 Dec. 1920, p. 4.
59 Ibid., 29 Aug. 1930, p. 8.
60 The Times, 12 March 1930, p. 15.
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the key effects highlighted in the theoretical literature.61 Similarly, on the National
Government’s financial proposals in 1931, the paper noted that ‘uncertainty as to
these has played havoc with the stock markets of late’.62 Depressed stock prices
could lead to lower investment and consumption through Tobin’s q and wealth
effects, respectively.
At the microeconomic level, Sir William Letts, chairman and managing director
of Willys Overland Crossley, a car manufacturer, told shareholders at the annual
general meeting:
I do not wish to introduce politics or thrust my opinion upon a body of shareholders,
but I think it is only right that attention should be directed to what has been and is really
hindering our business—the uncertainty regarding the McKenna duties. I believe that
no sensible Chancellor of the Exchequer would take these duties off, but uncertainty
exists, it is crippling business and holding back activity and energy in our great industry.
We rely upon the buying public, and if they are led to believe that prices will be reduced
if the duties come off, naturally they prefer to wait and see what happens. The result is
that our manufacturing programmes are held up and unemployment in our industry is
being increased. All this could be checked if the powers that be would make a definite
statement without delay.63
Similarly, ‘no one in the motor industry can go ahead and lay plans in advance
for large and economical production if there is complete uncertainty as to
whether the McKenna duties will be maintained’.64 The McKenna duties affected
not only the car industry but others too: ‘motorcar manufacturers and piano
manufacturers . . . could not believe that any British administration would be so
enslaved by financial pedantry as to keep our industries in disastrous uncertainty,
which is absolutely destructive of business’.65
Tariff anxieties also hung over the textile industry. To a chorus of ‘hear, hear’,
the chairman of the Fine Cotton Spinners and Doublers Association recounted
at the annual general meeting in 1930 that ‘uncertainty which existed throughout
the year as to whether the government intended to repeal the Safeguarding and
McKenna duties . . . undoubtedly gravely affected [the] particular trade as well as
the general trade of the country’.66 In dress goods, it was expected that business
‘held up because of uncertainty as to a tariff will now go to the French instead of
being placed here’.67 There was also uncertainty over duties on artificial silk, if the
‘duties are to be imposed, we would prefer to have them at once rather than have
any unnecessary prolongation of the present uncertainty. It is not only stopping the
weaving of the artificial silk but also of the cotton which would have gone to build
up the fabric in which the artificial silk is used’.68 This uncertainty continued in
the rayon industry for at least a decade, ‘retarding every branch of the trade from
the producer to the shopkeeper’.69
61 Daily Mail, 7 June 1920, p. 2.
62 Ibid., 7 Sept. 1931, p. 3.
63 Guardian, 25 Feb. 1930, p. 6.
64 Daily Mail, 13 Nov. 1929, p. 12.
65 Ibid., 16 April 1924, p. 8.
66 Guardian, 28 May 1930, p. 14.
67 Daily Mail, 14 Dec. 1923, p. 5.
68 Guardian, 20 June 1925, p. 13.
69 Ibid., 10 Dec. 1935, p. 7.
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In the electricity industry, there was damaging uncertainty over legislation. At
the ordinary general meeting of the British Electric Traction Company it was noted
that ‘it is undoubtedly true that further uncertainty has a serious deterrent effect
on enterprise in this important key industry’.70
In summary, the qualitative evidence is supportive of the uncertainty hypothesis.
According to contemporaries, policy uncertainty hit a number of industries from
cars to textiles. The impact of policy uncertainty on consumption and investment
was also recognized, dragging down employment and output.
V. The macroeconomic effects of economic policy uncertainty:
quantitative evidence
The economic consequences of uncertainty are clearly documented in the historical
record. This section investigates whether these effects are also evident in the
statistical record. In order to do so, the following VAR is estimated:
Xt = B (L) Xt−1 +Ut (1)
where Xt is a vector of endogenous variables that includes the level of the EPU
index and a macroeconomic variable of interest (for example, the natural logarithm
of real GDP at factor cost), B is a matrix of coefficients, and L is a polynomial in
the lag operator with P lags. A time trend and seasonal dummies are also included
as exogenous variables. The sample period is 1920 to 1938.
In terms of P, Baker et al. include three months of lags, while Alexopoulos and
Cohen use six.71 The Akaike information criterion (AIC) is minimized at three
lags, while the Schwarz Bayesian information criterion (BIC) is minimized at two.
In the baseline model, three lags are included, but as section VI shows the results
are robust to P = 2 and P = 6.
In terms of identification, a Cholesky decomposition is used. Alexopoulos and
Cohen and Baker et al. order uncertainty first, which assumes that economic
policy uncertainty affects the macroeconomy contemporaneously, but that the
macroeconomy does not affect economic policy uncertainty within the period.72
In this article, uncertainty is ordered last, which is a more cautious approach
that assumes that the economy affects uncertainty contemporaneously, but that
uncertainty only affects the economy with a lag. In any case, section VI shows that
the results are not sensitive to the ordering of the variables.
While this methodology is considered to be at the frontier in the literature, there is
an important caveat.73 A general empirical challenge is that increases in uncertainty
sometimes coincide with bad news. For example, a rise in the probability of warmay
lead to bothweaker confidence, expectations, or sentiment, and greater uncertainty.
If news is correlatedwith both uncertainty and economic activity, there is a potential
omitted variable bias problem, where the bias is likely to be negative so that the
economic costs of uncertainty may be overestimated. This possible issue should be
kept in mind when interpreting the macroeconomic effects of uncertainty.
70 Financial Times, 3 July 1920, p. 2.
71 Alexopoulos and Cohen, ‘Power of print’; Baker et al., ‘Measuring economic policy uncertainty’.
72 Ibid.
73 Novy and Taylor, ‘Trade and uncertainty’.
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Table 1. Data sources
Variable Source Description
Advances Capie and Collins, Inter-war British
economy, p. 96
London clearing banks. £ millions
Bank Rate Thomas and Dimsdale, ‘Millennium
of macroeconomic data’
%. End month
Economic activity index Albers, ‘Prelude’ Average 1925–33 = 100
EPU index See section II Average 1920–38 = 100
EPU index (alternative) Baker et al., ‘Measuring economic
policy uncertainty’
Average 1920–38 = 100
Exchange rate Thomas and Dimsdale, ‘Millennium
of macroeconomic data’
$/£
Major strikes Mitchell et al., ‘Monthly GDP
estimates’
Equals 1 during the major strikes
of 1921 and 1926 and 0
otherwise
M0 Capie and Webber,Monetary history
of the United Kingdom, pp. 56–7
£ millions. End month
Real exports and imports Capie and Collins, Inter-war British
economy, pp. 78, 83
£ millions at 1924 prices
Real GDP at factor cost and
market prices
Mitchell et al., ‘Monthly GDP
estimates’
£ millions at 1938 prices
Real government expenditure,
revenue, and debt
Economist, 1920–39. Collected for
month t from the first issue of
month t + 1
£ millions at 1924 prices. Deflated
by the retail price index
Real turnover Phelps Brown and Shackle, ‘Index of
real turnover’
Average 1930 = 100
Real wages Capie and Collins, Inter-war British
economy, p. 62
Deflated by the retail price index
Retail price index Capie and Collins, Inter-war British
economy, p. 38
Average 1924 = 100
Share price index Thomas and Dimsdale, ‘Millennium
of macroeconomic data’
Average 1920–38 = 100. Spliced
monthly index weighted by
market capitalization
Unemployment Capie and Collins, Inter-war British
economy, p. 63
%
Yield on consols Capie and Webber,Monetary history
of the United Kingdom, pp. 515–18
%. End month
The sources and definitions for the data used in the analysis are given in
table 1. Data on the debt, expenditure, and revenue of the government have been
collected from contemporary issues of the Economist.74 The remaining data are
from secondary sources. The main economic outcome of interest is real GDP at
factor cost, which has been calculated by allocating the annual total across the
months of the year based on the movements in a common factor, which itself is a
function of up to 14 indicators of economic activity collected by the Economist at
the time.75 The series has been used previously in econometric work.76 This and
other outcome variables are plotted in figure 3.
Turning to the main results of the article, figure 4 plots the response of
economic activity to a one-standard-deviation economic policy uncertainty shock,
where Xt includes the natural logarithm of real GDP at factor cost. The shaded
74 The data are available in online app. S1.
75 Mitchell, Solomou, and Weale, ‘Monthly GDP estimates’.
76 Cloyne, Dimsdale, and Postel-Vinay, ‘Taxes and growth’; Crafts and Mills, ‘Rearmament to the rescue?’;
eisdem, ‘Self-defeating austerity?’.
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Figure 3. Real GDP at factor cost, advances, real imports, and unemployment, 1920–
38
Source: See tab. 1.
area represents the 95 per cent confidence interval. The implication is that an
uncertainty shock had an economically and statistically significant effect on output,
declining by amaximum of−0.5 per cent (t = −3.1) after six months and returning
towards zero thereafter. The effect is statistically significant at the 5 per cent level
for the first 18 months.
Figure 5 illustrates the impulse response of the economic policy uncertainty
index to a one-standard-deviation innovation to itself. The index increases by
21.6 per cent (relative to its sample mean) on impact and decays thereafter.
Alexopoulos and Cohen and Baker et al. scale the shock to correspond to the
change around a major event, such as 9/11 or the Global Financial Crisis.77 In
order to compare the estimates, the shock is set to a 60 per cent increase (relative
to the sample average), which is equal to the change in April 1932, when there
were uncertainties across the spectrum of economic policy ahead of Chamberlain’s
first budget. On this basis, the peak fall in output is 1.5 per cent, which is between
Baker et al.’s and Alexopoulos and Cohen’s estimates of 1.1 per cent and 2 per cent,
respectively.78
77 Alexopoulos and Cohen, ‘Power of print’; Baker et al., ‘Measuring economic policy uncertainty’.
78 Ibid.
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Figure 4. Response of real GDP at factor cost to an EPU shock
Note: The shaded area represents the 95% confidence interval.
Source: Based on estimation of equation 1.
In terms of persistence, the peak economic impact occurs after six months.
While this is similar to the findings of Baker et al., it is more rapid than those
of Alexopoulos and Cohen, who find that output continues to decline for up to
18 months.79 The short, sharp drop in economic activity found in this article
is consistent with Bloom’s theoretical model of ‘wait-and-see’ uncertainty-driven
business cycles.80
A standout feature of the interwar period relative to othermacroeconomic epochs
in British history was the volatility of the business cycle. A variance decomposition
can speak to this issue. The results show that economic policy uncertainty explains
22 per cent of the variance in output, which suggests that uncertainty has been an
underappreciated cause of macroeconomic volatility in interwar Britain.
In times of uncertainty, households and firms delay decisions that are costly to
reverse. Previous empirical and theoretical work has shown that this wait-and-see
effect is associated with reduced credit, lower imports, and lost jobs.81 This article
therefore moves beyond GDP to explore these other economic outcomes. In order
to do so, a series of alternative variables of interest are rotated into Xt .
79 Ibid.
80 Bloom, ‘Impact of uncertainty shocks’.
81 Bordo, Duka, and Koch, ‘Economic policy uncertainty’; Novy and Taylor, ‘Trade and uncertainty’;
Alexopoulos and Cohen, ‘Power of print’; Baker et al., ‘Measuring economic policy uncertainty’.
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Figure 5. Response of EPU to an EPU shock
Note: The shaded area represents the 95% confidence interval.
Source: Based on estimation of equation 1.
Figure 6 shows the response of credit, imports, and unemployment in response to
a one-standard-deviation uncertainty shock. Panel A shows that there is a persistent
decline in credit of up to 0.8 per cent (t = −2.9), which implies a ‘financial frictions
effect’.82 Panel B displays a reduction in the volume of imports of 1.2 per cent
(t = −3.5). That the fall is larger in trade than in output is consistent with
the ‘magnification effect’ documented by Novy and Taylor.83 In their theoretical
model, firms cut orders of foreign inputs to a greater degree than domestic inputs
under uncertainty, as there are larger fixed costs associated with transporting
goods internationally. There is therefore a higher option value of waiting when
ordering inputs from abroad. As a result, imports fall by more than economic
activity. Panel C shows a hump-shaped impact on unemployment, peaking at 0.4
percentage points (t = 2.6) after seven months and slowly subsiding after. The
effect is statistically significant at the 5 per cent level for the first 18 months.
Consistent with the narrative evidence, the statistical results suggest that
uncertainty caused widespread disruption. However, given the discussion about
the potential confounding influence of news, the magnitude of the estimates are
probably an upper bound (in absolute terms) on the true causal effects.
82 Jurado et al., ‘Measuring uncertainty’.
83 Novy and Taylor, ‘Trade and uncertainty’.
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Panel C. Unemployment
Figure 6. Response of advances, real imports, and unemployment to an EPU shock
Note: The shaded areas represent the 95% confidence intervals.
Source: Based on estimation of equation 1.
VI. Robustness
This section assesses the sensitivity of the results to alternative measures of
uncertainty and economic activity, to variations of the econometric specification,
and to the inclusion of additional control variables.
An interesting question is whether the results are robust to alternativemeasures of
uncertainty. A common measure of general uncertainty is stock market volatility,
measured as the monthly standard deviation of daily stock returns.84 As daily
data are not readily available throughout the interwar period, a GARCH(1,1)
model is estimated for the logarithmic change in monthly share prices, which
yields a time-varying monthly measure of the conditional standard deviation of
stock returns. Figure 7 shows the response of output to a one-standard-deviation
shock to this measure of uncertainty, alongside the baseline impulse response
and confidence interval. The results are similar, if a little stronger, peaking at
−0.7 per cent (t = −3.6) after 10 months. Figure 7 also plots the results where
EPU in equation 1 is substituted by Baker et al.’s indicator of policy uncertainty.85
The response is similar to the baseline, peaking at −0.7 per cent (t = −4.3).
The baseline measure of economic activity is real GDP at factor cost, which has
been estimated using annual data from the national accounts and high-frequency
84 Mathy and Ziebarth, ‘How much does political uncertainty matter?’; Mathy, ‘Stock volatility’.
85 Baker et al., ‘Measuring economic policy uncertainty’.
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Figure 7. Sensitivity to alternative measures of uncertainty
Note: The shaded area represents the 95% confidence interval.
Source: Based on estimation of equation 1.
data for a collection of indicators. A potential concern is that this series may
be measured with error. The sensitivity of the results is therefore investigated in
incremental steps. Figure 8 plots the impulse response functions from thesemodels,
as well as the baseline point estimates and confidence interval.
The first step is to use real GDP measured at market prices instead of at
factor cost. Both are based on the same high-frequency indicators but have been
normalized using different annual estimates of real GDP. As the two series are
highly correlated, it is unsurprising that the effects are unchanged. The second is
to use an index of economic activity, which has been calculated using an alternative
econometric methodology and different high-frequency indicators. The peak drop
of 0.4 per cent (t = −1.9) is similar to the baseline but is less precisely estimated,
which is a consequence of the shorter sample (the index is only available between
1925 and 1936). The third is to use real turnover, which is an indicator of
‘the physical amount of goods and services traded’ that is available from 1920
to 1936.86 This measure is associated with a decline of up to 0.7 per cent
(t = −3.8).
A number of decisions had to be made to estimate the model. The first was
the number of lags to include. In the baseline case, three months of lags were
included, whichwasmotivated both by theminimization of the AIC and by previous
86 Phelps Brown and Shackle, ‘Index of real turnover’.
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Figure 8. Sensitivity to alternative measures of economic activity
Note: The shaded area represents the 95% confidence interval.
Source: Based on estimation of equation 1.
research.87 However, the BIC was minimized with two lags. Reducing the lag
length raises the peak effect to –0.7 per cent (t = −3.7), while the effects remain
statistically significant between months 1 and 14. Alexopoulos and Cohen, on
the other hand, include six months of lags in their VAR model.88 The inclusion of
extra lags also increases the peak effect to –0.7 per cent (t = −3.7). The response is
statistically significant between months 1 and 19. The impulse response functions
for these alternative specifications are plotted in figure 9.
The second decision was the causal ordering. In the baseline case, output
was ordered before uncertainty, which implies that output affected uncertainty
contemporaneously but not vice versa. The sensitivity of the results to this
assumption can easily be gauged by reversing the order so that uncertainty is
first and output second. The peak effect is unchanged at –0.5 per cent (t = −2.6)
and is statistically significant between months 2 and 16.
The third decision was the econometricmodel. A plausible alternative to the VAR
is a local projections model, which imposes weaker assumptions on the dynamics
of the data but is less efficient and may suffer from excessive variability.89 To
87 Baker et al., ‘Measuring economic policy uncertainty’.
88 Alexopoulos and Cohen, ‘Power of print’.
89 Jorda`, ‘Estimation and inference’; Barnichon and Brownlees, ‘Impulse response estimation’.
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Figure 9. Sensitivity to alternative specifications
Note: The shaded area represents the 95% confidence interval.
Source: Based on estimation of equations 1 and 2.
explore the sensitivity of the results to the econometric method, the following local
projections model was estimated:






θh,kyt−k + ϕzt + et+h (2)
where yt+h is the natural logarithm of real GDP at factor cost, EPUt is the new
index of economic policy uncertainty, and zt is a series of exogenous variables that
includes a constant, seasonal dummies, and a time trend. βh measures the impulse
response of economic activity to uncertainty at time t + h. The shock has been
scaled to match the increase in uncertainty in the baseline model (one standard
deviation or 21.6 per cent relative to the sample mean) so that the responses
are comparable. Inference is based on Newey–West standard errors, where the
maximum autocorrelation lag is set to h + 1.90
At horizon (h) 0, equation 2 regresses the log-level of economic activity on
itself, meaning that the coefficients on output and policy uncertainty are 1 and
0 respectively. At horizons beyond 0, variation in uncertainty that is orthogonal
to output contemporaneously is free to have a non-zero effect. This ordering of
90 Tenreyro and Thwaites, ‘Pushing on a string’.
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Table 2. Peak effects from alternative models (%)
Specification Peak effect
(1) Alternative measure of uncertainty: GARCH −0.7 (−3.6)
(2) Alternative measure of uncertainty: Baker et al. −0.7 (−4.3)
(3) Alternative measure of economic activity: real GDP at market prices −0.5 (−3.1)
(4) Alternative measure of economic activity: economic activity index −0.4 (−1.9)
(5) Alternative measure of economic activity: real turnover −0.7 (−3.8)
(6) Alternative specification: 2 lags −0.7 (−3.7)
(7) Alternative specification: 6 lags −0.7 (−3.7)
(8) Alternative specification: reverse ordering −0.5 (−2.6)
(9) Alternative specification: local projections −1.1 (−2.7)
(10) Additional control variable: real government expenditure −0.6 (−3.2)
(11) Additional control variable: real government revenue −0.5 (−3.1)
(12) Additional control variable: real government debt −0.6 (−3.1)
(13) Additional control variable: Bank Rate −0.5 (−3.1)
(14) Additional control variable: M0 −0.5 (−3.0)
(15) Additional control variable: yield on consols −0.6 (−3.4)
(16) Additional control variable: real exports −0.5 (−3.1)
(17) Additional control variable: real wages −0.5 (−3.2)
(18) Additional control variable: retail price index −0.5 (−3.1)
(19) Additional control variable: share price index −0.3 (−2.1)
(20) Additional control variable: major strikes −0.4 (−2.5)





Note: t-statistics in parentheses.
Source: Based on estimation of equations 1 and 2.
the variables is consistent with the Cholesky decomposition used in the baseline
model.
The responses from the local projections model are larger than those from the
VAR, but are, as expected, less precisely estimated and not as smooth. Following
a one-standard-deviation shock to uncertainty, economic activity falls by up to
1.1 per cent (t = −2.7) after 12 months. The effects are statistically significant
throughout most of the forecast horizon.
The baseline model was a bivariate VAR. This parsimonious approach was taken
not only for its simplicity but also because it has been used in previous research.91
However, if there were other determinants of output that were also correlated with
economic policy uncertainty, then the impulse responses could be affected.
Table 2 presents the peak effects from a variety of models. Rows 10 to 21 show
the results frommodels where a control variable of interest has been rotated in. The
first set of control variables relates to fiscal policy, including the natural logarithm of
real government expenditure, revenue, and debt. The second set of controls relates
to monetary policy, such as Bank Rate and the monetary base (M0). The yield on
consols, which reflects both fiscal and monetary policy, is also included. The third
set of controls relates to the more general economy: the natural logarithms of real
exports, real wages, retail price index, share prices, a dummy variable for major
91 Alexopoulos and Cohen, ‘Power of print’; Baker et al., ‘Measuring economic policy uncertainty’.
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strikes, and the level of the exchange rate. The inclusion of these variables has little
impact on the size or precision of the estimated responses.
In order to gauge the sensitivity of the baseline results to alternative specifications,
21 additional models have been estimated, which experiment with alternative
measures of uncertainty and economic activity, with the econometric specification
and with the inclusion of additional control variables. The results are summarized
in table 2: the minimum peak effect was –1.1 per cent (t = −2.7), while the
maximum was –0.3 per cent (t = −2.1). In each and every case, the peak impact
was statistically significant. The mean peak was –0.6 per cent, which is slightly
larger (in absolute terms) than the baseline estimate. The depressive impact of
uncertainty on the British interwar economy is therefore a robust result.
VII. Conclusion
The British economy was deeply unstable between the wars. Economic historians
have identified a number of causes, from the demise of the old staples to
the shortening of the working week. Macroeconomists, however, emphasize the
significance of not only first but also second moment shocks, such as uncertainty.
This article has argued that uncertainty was an important source of fluctuations in
interwar Britain.
In order to test this hypothesis, two types of evidence were investigated.
The first was qualitative. A close inspection of newspaper reports revealed
that contemporaries—academics, businesspeople, journalists, and politicians—
harboured great uncertainties. There were doubts over fiscal, monetary, and tariff
policy, which peaked around budgets and general elections. Agents associated this
uncertainty with a range of negative economic outcomes.
The second type of evidence explored was quantitative. Based on a new index
and a VAR, it was found that uncertainty was associated with a fall in output, a
rise in unemployment, and more than a fifth of macroeconomic volatility. These
effects are economically meaningful, statistically significant, and robust to more
than 20 permutations of the model. Therefore, both types of evidence suggest that
uncertainty was an important source of instability in interwar Britain.
The goal of the article was to use state-of-the-art methods to understand whether
uncertainty mattered in an important historical context. However, there are a
number of opportunities to push the empirical frontier that are promising avenues
for future research. The first is to disentangle news from uncertainty to establish
the size of the potential bias. The second is to distinguish downside and upside
uncertainty in order to test for the possible non-linearities of the bad news principle.
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